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DPGs). DPGs are inﬁnite horizon games in which political institutions are endogenously determined
each period. Speciﬁcally, at each date t, a social choice rule determines both the current public policy
and the social choice rule to be used in date t + 1. These rules are instrumental choices in the sense
that they do not aﬀect payoﬀs or technology directly.
We show that any dynamic political game can be transformed into a stochastic game in which
the political institutions are reinterpreted as “public players” in a noncooperative, stochastic game
played against private citizens. The public players’ preferences may be dynamically inconsistent due
to the fact that naturally occurring changes in the economic state, such as evolution of the wealth
distribution, alter the way a political institution aggregates preferences of the citizenry over time. The
paper characterizes this transformation, and establishes existence of Markov equilibria in which the
Markov strategies are smooth functions of the state. Applicability of the result is demonstrated in an
example with endogenous voting rules.
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11 Introduction
This paper introduces and examines equilibrium existence in a class of inﬁnite horizon games in
which political institutions are determined endogenously. We refer to these games as dynamic
political games (or DPGs). In a DPG, future political institutions are chosen by the existing
political institution.
At each date t, private decisions of individual citizens are combined with a public policy
decision such as a tax rate or a quantity of a public good. A political rule, summarized by a
parameter θt, is a social choice correspondence deﬁned on the preference proﬁles of these citizens.
The political rule θt determines both the payoﬀ-relevant decisions in the current period and a
future political rule θt+1 for next period. The potential rules for choosing decisions in period
t + 1 are therefore objects of choice in period t.
A key feature of this recursive process is that political rules are instrumental choices: the
rules do not aﬀect payoﬀs or technology directly. Decision makers in a DPG thus modify existing
rules, not because the details of rules enter into their utility functions, but rather because these
details alter the process of policy determination in future periods.
A politically feasible strategy is an endogenous law of motion for policies, private decisions,
and political rules such that at each date and after any history, each citizen chooses his private
decision, while the current policy and future political rule are selected from the prevailing social
choice correspondence. Political feasibility is analogous to Subgame Perfection in the sense that
the strategies must yield implementable social choices after any history.
The paper’s main result establishes existence of politically feasible strategies. In particular,
we establish existence of politically feasible Markov strategies, i.e., strategies that vary only
with current state. Moreover, these Markov strategies are shown to be smooth functions of the
state.
Though “equilibrium existence” often connotes a purely technical exercise, the result oﬀers
some broader insights to the problems of dynamically endogenous institutional change. First,
the existence issue brings to light some internal weaknesses of many common political insti-
tutions in making intertemporal decisions. To elaborate, the basic idea of the result is that
any dynamic political game can be transformed into a more familiar looking object. Political
institutions, because they are represented here by social choice rules, may be rationalized by
social welfare functions or aggregators without loss of generality. These aggregators resemble
the dynamic payoﬀs of an individual decision maker. Taking this interpretation one step fur-
ther, a game with n citizens and a political aggregation rule is transformed into a stochastic
game in which all public decisions are determined by an additional “public player.”
In the case where a political rule is a dictatorship by one of the citizens, this is easy to see.
1The “public player” is simply the dictator. In general, however, the game must be transformed
into a stochastic game with a dynamically inconsistent player. This happens despite the fact
that every citizen’s preferences are (by assumption) perfectly dynamically consistent.
To be clear about what this means, the “dynamic inconsistency” in the present model
subsumes the common notion of “time inconsistency” (although the two terms are often used
interchangeably) but can also be something quite diﬀerent from it. Both terms refer to a tension
between a decision maker’s incentives at diﬀerent points in time. However, time consistency
typically refers to the tension created by one’s inability to make commitments and the credibility
of one’s choices given the reaction of other individuals in the game.1 By contrast, “dynamic
inconsistency” can also refer to a structural “defect” in an individual’s own preferences. The
latter can occur even in the absence of any choices of others.
Dynamic inconsistencies — especially the latter sort — arise quite naturally in political rules
such as wealth-weighted voting. For example, consider a voting rule in which each individual is
allocated a number of votes proportional to his current wealth. A variation of this rule was used
in Prussia in the mid 19th century. There the electorate was divided into thirds, each third
given equal weight in the voting. The wealthiest individuals who accounted for the ﬁrst third
of taxes paid accounted for 3.5% of the population. The next wealthiest group that accounted
for the middle third accounted for 10-12% of the population. The remainder accounted for the
remaining third (see Finer (1997)).
More prosaic examples of wealth-weighted voting exist in contemporary institutions. In
fact, any polity in which money plays a role in determining policy (e.g., through campaign con-
tributions, political advertising, direct bribes, etc.) can yield wealth-weighted voting outcomes.
To see why wealth-weighted voting rules are dynamically inconsistent, consider an economy
in which self-interested individuals diﬀer only by wealth, and a pivotal voter exists. Then
under quite normally occurring changes in the wealth distribution, the identity of a pivotal
voter will change over time. This would occur if, for instance, the variance in the wealth
distribution increases as time passes. Hence, the identity of the pivotal voter tomorrow will
be fundamentally diﬀerent than the identity of the pivotal voter today. But since the current
pivotal voter evaluates future decisions according to own identity, rather than that of the future
pivotal voter, a standard inconsistency arises.2
So why does the transformation of rules into dynamically inconsistent players matter for
a theory of endogenous institutions? Notice that the choice of θt+1 by the “public player” in
period t amounts to a strategic delegation problem. The date t public player delegates de-
cision authority to (t + 1)-player. The simple example suggests that the inconsistency must
1The large literature following Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) inﬂuential work typically interprets time con-
sistency in this sense.
2Dynamic inconsistencies can also arise, of course, in an unweighted median voter model, but it would require
more controversial modeling assumptions about the wealth distribution.
2inﬂuence that choice to a large degree. Namely, it creates a desire to foreclose the inevitable
loss of power by the current pivotal voter. In other words, the internal inconsistency in the
institution’s structure, rather than external commitment problems, can be the critical determi-
nant of endogenous change of political institutions.3 This stands in contrast to much of the
literature on dynamically endogenous institutions, for example Gradstein and Justman (1999),
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001, 2005), Lagunoﬀ (2001), Greif and Laitin (2004), Jack and
Lagunoﬀ (2006a,b), Cervellati, et. al. (2006), and Gradstein (2007). In most of the literature,
the inability to commit to policies that could eliminate external threats create a rationale for
change.
The idea that dynamic inconsistency is a structural attribute of a political institution is, of
course, not new. There are numerous models of majority voting which exhibit tensions between
present and future median voters. A sample includes Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Krusell and
R´ ıos-Rull (1996), Amador (2003), Nataraj Slavov (2006), Messner and Polborn (2004), and
Lagunoﬀ (2006). The last two take it one step further and use this inconsistency to model
some form of institutional change. Messner and Polborn model preference reversals of voters as
they age. The model helps to explain why current pivotal voters may opt for more conservative
supermajority rules in the future. The Lagunoﬀ paper is a companion to this paper, using the
present model to examine stability of political rules.
The present paper adds to this literature by demonstrating the breadth of this problem
via the equilibrium existence logic. The result applies to all forms of rule-based inconsistency
in which the aggregator preserves the time separability of individual preferences. Hence the
most commonly modeled forms of dynamic inconsistency, including, for instance, hyperbolic
preferences are included.
The result does, however, have limitations. It does not, for example, produce any new voting
aggregation result for static games. In particular, we take as a starting point those environments
and rules that admit solutions in static models. Since the public decision problem each period
is inherently multi-dimensional, this basically means that either the rule is not a voting rule,
or more reasonably, that payoﬀs are restricted so that voting admits a solution (e.g., majority
voting under order-restricted preferences (Rothstein (1980)).
The existence result does, however, make progress in extending aggregation results to dy-
namic environments. The extension is nontrivial because of the “political ﬁxed point problem”
that arises in all dynamic models of political preference aggregation. The problem is as follows.
Voting aggregation in period t depends on citizens’ preference orderings over all contingent
polices starting from date t. But these preference orderings depend on the anticipated eﬀect of
the current policy on the future (equilibrium) policy strategy in period t + 1. The date t + 1
policy strategy, however, comes from the political preference aggregation in date t + 1 which,
repeating by the same argument as before, depends on political preference aggregation in date
3See Lagunoﬀ 2006 for a fuller development of this idea.
3t + 2, and so on. This means that a rule admits a solution in date t only if all admissible rules
admit solutions in all future periods and in all future states.
For obvious reasons, this problem does not arise in static models. Hence, while the present
existence theorem does not resolve the problem for all conceivable political institutions (since
many of these institutions are problematic in the simpler static environments), it does apply
to a large variety of rules and environments that are not covered under previous equilibrium
existence theorems. One such example is laid out in Section 2.
The theorem itself adapts some elements of an elegant result of Horst (2005). Horst proves
the existence of smooth Markov equilibria in a class of standard stochastic games. The critical
assumption is a “Moderate Social Inﬂuence (MSI).” Roughly speaking, MSI bounds the eﬀect
of others’ actions one one’s own marginal payoﬀ uniformly over all states and in all periods of
the game. MSI establishes uniformly Lipschitzian bounds on the players’ marginal best replies.
In turn, this fact is used to establish continuity of each player’s “Bellman’s” operator. The
present model faces an additional complication that does not arise in Horst or related other
results. Namely, that in the transformation of each rule as a “player,” this player’s preferences
are dynamically inconsistent. This, in turn, implies that the player’s current value map is not
a Bellman’s operator. Despite this, the proof shows that as long as the inconsistency preserves
time (though possibly not state) separability of each player’s dynamic preferences, the uniform
Lipschitzian bounds property still holds. Hence, the result can be extended to these preferences.
The paper is organized as follows. The general model and equilibrium concept are described
in Section 2. A canonical example is developed which illustrates the applicability of the main
result. The result itself is described in Section 3. Section 4 oﬀers concluding remarks and
discusses related literature in more detail. The proof of the main result is in the Appendix.
2 Dynamic Political Games
Informally, a dynamic political game is a standard stochastic game with the addition of an
explicit social choice rule that maps preference proﬁles to collective decisions at each date t.
One part of this decision is the rule to be used in date t+1. The setup is necessarily complicated
by the fact that one critical primitive — the rule by which preferences are aggregated — is
deﬁned on endogenous dynamic preferences. Section 2.1 ﬁrst speciﬁes all the components of the
model. Section 2.2 then summarizes these components in the deﬁnition of a dynamic political
game, and proceeds with a deﬁnition of political feasibility.
From here on, all deﬁned sets are assumed to Borel measurable subsets of Euclidian spaces,
and all deﬁned functions and correspondences are assumed measurable. In addition, all feasible
choice spaces (e.g., the space of feasible policies) are assumed to be compact.
42.1 The General Model
Formally, time is discrete and indexed by t = 0,1,.... Let I = {1,...,n} denote a society of
inﬁnitely lived individuals. An individual is denoted by i ∈ I. At each date t, two types of
decisions, private and public, are determined simultaneously. An individual’s private decision
is one that aﬀects him exclusively. Individual i’s private action eit at date t is chosen from a
feasible set E. Later, we will explicitly assume that eit is actually chosen by individual i. For
now, however, we leave the issue of “who chooses what” open. Let et = (e1t,...,ent) denote a
vector of private decisions. A policy decision pt is determined collectively by society as a whole
from the feasible set P. As with private decisions, we defer the discussion of precisely what
“determined collectively” means until later.
The date t stage payoﬀ of each individual depends on the proﬁle of private decisions, et,
on the policy pt, and on a state variable ωt drawn from a set Ω. Let u = (u1,...,un) be a
proﬁle of stage game payoﬀ functions, where each ui is continuous, nonnegative, and expressed










In (1), δ is the common discount factor, ω0 is the initial state, and the expectation is taken with
respect to a stochastic transition technology that determines how current states, private actions
and public policies pin down distributions over future states. Formally, let q(B| ωt,et,pt) denote
the probability that ωt+1 belongs to the Borel measurable subset B ⊆ Ω, given the current state
ωt, the private decision proﬁle, et, and the policy pt. The Markov kernel q is assumed to be
weakly continuous on Ω×En×P, and the expected value in (1) is assumed to be ﬁnite for any
initial state and feasible sequence of decisions.
The process that determines all decision variables is summarized by a parameter θt. This
θt identiﬁes a social choice function that aggregates individual preferences. We refer to the
parameter θt as a political rule. Let Θ denote the set of admissible political rules for this
society. Ordinarily social choice rules are straightforward objects: mappings from preferences
to outcomes. However, in this case the notion is complicated by the fact that the domain of
a rule is the space of individuals’ dynamic preference proﬁles. These preferences may depend
endogenously on how others’ condition on the realized history in future periods. To address
this issue, we proceed cautiously as follows.
The composite state at date t is summarized by the pair (ωt,θt), consisting of an “economic”
state and a political rule. A history at date t is
h
t = ((ω0,θ0,e0,p0),...,(ωt−1,θt−1,et−1,pt−1),(ωt,θt))
which includes all past data up to that point in time, as well as the current composite state
(ωt,θt). The initial history is h0 = (ω0,θ0,∅). Let H denote the set of all histories at all dates.
5For each citizen i, a private strategy σi : H → E deﬁnes a history-contingent action σi(ht)
describing i’s private action after observing history ht. A proﬁle of private strategies is given by
σ = (σi)i∈I. Similarly, a public strategy for this society is a pair ψ : H → P and µ : H → Θ that
deﬁne, respectively, the policy pt = ψ(ht) and the subsequent period’s political rule θt+1 = µ(ht).
To re-iterate, these strategies map from histories that include the current economic state and
political rule. A public strategy determines both a current policy and the subsequent period’s
political rule.
Denote the set of private, policy and institutional strategies by Σ, Ψ and M, respec-
tively. A strategy proﬁle is a triple (σ,ψ,µ) ∈ Σn × Ψ × M which produces an action proﬁle
(σ(ht),ψ(ht),µ(ht)) = (et,pt,θt+1) after every history ht ∈ H. These strategies, together with
the Markov kernel q, determine a stochastic process over realized histories. Given any realized
history ht ∈ H, a citizen’s preference function over proﬁles (σ,ψ,µ) in the continuation of the
game is given by
Vi(h












In (2), the expectation Eq,µ is taken with respect to the distribution on future states (ωτ,θτ), τ ≥
t induced by q and µ. Notice that the institutional strategy µ enters the payoﬀ Vi only indirectly
through the private and public strategies, σ and ψ, since these may vary with the current and
past θs. A more convenient way to express (2) is given by
Vi(h
t; σ,ψ,µ) = (1−δ) ui(ωt, σ(h
t), ψ(h












Equation (3) deﬁnes the recursive form of the dynamic utility function Vi(ht; ·) over strategies
(σ,ψ,µ) following ht.
The tools are now in place to deﬁne the political rules explicitly. A class of political rules
is a pair (Θ,C) where Θ is an index set and C is a social choice map deﬁned such that, for
any history ht, C is a cylinder set C( V1(ht; ·),...,Vn(ht; ·) ; ωt,θt ) ⊂ Σn × Ψ × M (in the
sense that no restrictions are placed on decisions (σ(hτ),ψ(hτ),µ(hτ)), τ < t prior to date t).
Hence, by writing (σ,ψ,µ) ∈ C( V1(ht; ·),...,Vn(ht; ·) ; ωt,θt ), the meaning is that (σ,ψ,µ) is
the social choice under preference proﬁle (V1(ht; ·),...,Vn(ht; ·) ) following history ht. Notice
that it is not assumed at the outset that C is non-empty valued. This is precisely part of the
equilibrium existence problem that we address later on.
Putting together all the components of the model, a Dynamic Political Game (DPG) is
deﬁned as the collection
G ≡ h u,q,Ω,E,P, Θ,C, ω0,θ0i
Finally, given a dynamic political game G, we seek an equilibrium concept that does not
assume that a political rule at date t can commit to a ﬁxed law of motion governing political
6rules and policies for the indeﬁnite future. Arguably, a commitment of this type would be
impossible in any real society. Our equilibrium deﬁnition below therefore builds in the lack
of strategic commitment by requiring implementable decisions at date t to be consistent with
implementable decisions at date t + 1.
Deﬁnition A strategy proﬁle (σ,ψ,µ) as politically feasible if it constitutes a social choice for
this society at each date and after any history. In other words, a politically feasible (σ,ψ,µ)
satisﬁes
(σ,ψ,µ) ∈ C( V1(h
t; ·),...,Vn(h
t; ·) ; ωt,θt ) ∀ h
t, ∀ t = 0,1,... (4)
Politically feasible strategies that vary only with the current (Markov) state (ωt,θt) are referred
to as politically feasible Markov strategies.
2.2 Some Comments on the General Model
At this point, a few remarks may help clarify the modeling choices. First, by summarizing the
political process by (Θ,C), we adopt the “detail free” approach of social choice rather than
the fully explicit approach of noncooperative game theory. One could, of course, make the case
that the noncooperative approach is preferable. For instance, the political rule could deﬁne a
noncooperative voting game whereby today’s votes determine which voting game is to be used
tomorrow. Consequently, endogenous institutions could arise as Nash equilibrium outcomes of
a standard stochastic game. The issue becomes: which game? While there are agreed upon
canonical social choice representations of voting, there are relatively few such games. For one
thing, strategic models of politics are notoriously sensitive to minor details. For another, the
dynamics of detailed political rules are hard to model, which may explain why the literature
is sparse.4 Ultimately, the trade-oﬀ is one of “explicitness” versus “representativeness” and
tractability. The approach taken here favors the latter.
Second, “political rules” are modeled for now as objects that subsume both public and
private decisions. This is largely just a notational convenience, since C can always encode
any decision left up to the individual. A natural presumption is that private decisions are
determined privately. We will in fact assume this in the next Section.5
Third, though C can vary in the state st it is assumed to have no structural dependence
on past history. Indirect dependence can arise, however, through citizen preferences. This is
not a purely technical assumption. Rather, it preserves the intuitive idea that there are critical
diﬀerences between de jure and de facto political processes. The de jure rule, expressed by C,
is the explicit constitutional prescription that formally dictates who can participate, how votes
4See Gomes and Jehiel (2005) for one promising “hybrid” approach that largely avoids this problem.
5There are cases where private actions are not determined privately. Theocracies, for example, prescribe
and enforce detailed behavior for individuals. In some cases, these prescriptions leave little room for individual
choice.
7are counted, etc. It may use information about the current state, but not typically past history.
The de facto process would additionally include historical precedents and norms, as expressed
in the citizens’ equilibrium strategies.6
We illustrate the meaning of a politically feasible strategy in the following example. In
both the notation below and in the remainder of the paper, an omitted subscript refers to the
vector-valued proﬁle, i.e., V (ht; ·) = (V1(ht; ·),...,Vn(ht; ·)).
Example 2.1. Suppose E = ∅, i.e., there are no private decisions (and so the Example omits
e from the notation). Now suppose there are two possible political rules which we categorize as
“Democracy” and “Dictatorship by Player 1.” In this case, Θ = {θM,θD} where, if θ = θM
then the resulting public decision must be Majoritarian, i.e., resulting in public outcomes that
dominate any alternative in a pairwise majority vote. If θ = θD then the strategies are imposed
by Citizen i = 1. Then deﬁne politically feasible (public) decisions by:
C( V (h
t; ·) ; ωt,θt ) =

    
    




t; ψ,µ) if θt = θD
where (ψ,µ) is a Majoritarian outcome or “Condorcet Winner” if for all ( ˆ ψ, ˆ µ),
|{i ∈ I : Vi(h
t; ψ,µ) < Vi(h




Other examples of politically feasible rules are easy construct. For instance θ could identify
the fraction of individuals required to pass a public decision (endogenous supermajority rules).
Alternatively, θ might identify the subset of individuals who currently possess the right to vote
(endogenous voting franchise) or the collection of goods to be determined by the public rather
than private sector.
2.3 “Rules as Players”: Public Aggregators and Private Decisions
Political feasibility is essentially a Subgame Perfection idea for social choice rules. Strategies
must be politically feasible at each date and after any history. In this section, the model is fur-
ther specialized in two ways. First, we adopt the literal meaning of “private actions” and assume
that each citizen i chooses the action eit in date t. Next, we identify the public part of C with a
social welfare function, referred to as an aggregator. Informally, an aggregator is a social welfare
function that aggregates the preferences of the citizens each period to produce a social ranking
6See also Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) who provide a more explicit model that examines the diﬀerence
between the de facto and de jure institutions.
8over public decisions pt and θt+1, taking as given the strategies of private citizens. Formally, an
aggregator is a function F : I R
n
+ × Ω × Θ → I R+ expressed as F (V (ht; σ,ψ,µ), ωt,θt).7 The
social choice problem is thereby transformed into a noncooperative game consisting of the n
private citizens and the aggregator. A class of rules (C,Θ) is jointly rationalized by the citizens
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The problem now has the look of a more standard formulation. Notice that public and
private decisions are now chosen separately. Each period, the n private citizens each choose their
own private actions, while a “public player,” whose payoﬀ function is a social welfare function
F chooses the public decisions taking as given the private strategies of citizens. Consequently,
a dynamic political game maps to a stochastic game with n private agents and |Ω|×|Θ| public
ones.
2.4 Dynamic Inconsistency within a Single Rule
Unfortunately, the transformed game described above may not be not very tractable. There
are |Ω|×|Θ| “public” players, but Ω is not generally ﬁnite or even bounded. A more tractable
approach — the one adopted here — is to transform the dynamic political game into a stochastic
game with a single public player. In this case the payoﬀ function of the “public” agent will not
generally be dynamically consistent.8
To understand the source of the inconsistency, we illustrate the problem under a single
political rule. Let an economic state be given by ωt = (Gt,yt), where yt = (y1t,...,ynt) with yit
the wealth of Citizen i at date t, and Gt is the stock of a durable public good at t. Let stage
game utility be of the form ui = κ(yit)u(Gt,eit,pt)+v(Gt,eit,pt) where κ is strictly increasing.
Suppose that at t = 0 the initial wealth distribution is yi0 and y10 ≤ ··· ≤ yn0. We omit the
description of the technology for Gt since it is not relevant to the example.
For purposes of illustration, suppose that there there is only one admissible political rule,
i.e., Θ = {θ}. Let θ be deﬁned as follows. Fixing a private strategy σ for the remainder of the
7Recall that V (ht; σ,ψ,µ) in this expression is a vector-valued proﬁle of preferences of all citizens.
8See Lagunoﬀ (2006) for a precise deﬁnition of dynamic consistency. For our purposes, we use the term in the
typical sense that the set of solutions to the “full commitment problem” is diﬀerent than the set of sequentially
rational solutions.









j ∈ I : Vj(h
t; σ,ψ,µ) ≥ (1 − δ)uj(ωt,σ(h






indicating the set of individuals who weakly prefer the public action pair (ψ(ht),µ(ht)) to the
action pair (pt,θt+1), given the continuation V (ht+1;σ,ψ,µ). Of course, in this example θt+1 =
θt = θ. According to this rule, public decisions are those that survive pairwise comparisons
against any other public decision when each citizen is endowed with yit votes to cast in the
election. This is sometimes referred to as the Wealth-as-Power rule.9
Given a law of motion for wealth distribution, it is easy to see how the identity of the pivotal
voter under this rule can change over time. To illustrate this starkly, suppose (1) the median
wealth level, denoted by yM0 satisﬁes yM0 = 1
2
Pn
j=1 yj0. This implies that the initial pivotal
decision maker under the Wealth-as-Power rule is precisely the median voter; (2) suppose that
for t ≥ 1, yi t+1 = yit + zi with zi > 0, zn > 1/2, and z1 < ··· < zn. In this example,
the ordering of the wealth distribution does not change over time (hence, the identity of the
median voter remains constant). However, wealthier citizens accumulate wealth faster than
poorer ones. In fact, for t suﬃciently large, ynt > 1
2
Pn
j=1 yjt. In other words, the richest citizen
eventually accumulates over half the total wealth.
It is clear that under the Wealth-as-Power rule, the identity of the pivotal voter changes
from the median to the richest individual i = n. Hence, the rule gives rise to a natural dynamic
inconsistency. Namely, the tension between today’s pivotal voter and tomorrow’s creates a
natural bias not unlike that of a hyperbolic decision maker.
By our restriction to a single rule θ, we illustrate that dynamic inconsistency arises because
of intertemporal conﬂicts arising from de facto changes of power, in this case, under a single
rule, and not because of conﬂicts between rules. One could, of course, observe that in a richer
example, i.e., one with more admissible political rules to choose from, the decisive voter at date
0 might opt for a diﬀerent rule — one that preserves his de facto power rather than face the
loss of power under the same (de jure) rule. This is precisely the subject of an aforementioned
companion paper which examines the properties of the equilibrium and asks when and whether
a rule is stable. For now, our interest in the potential for dynamic inconsistency. Depending
on the richness of the set Θ, an example with some additional options can still display an
inconsistency.10
9See, for instance, Jordan (2006).
10Clearly, in any model of dynamic inconsistency, a richer set of options or strategies that build in commitment
can eliminate the inconsistency. One could then ask: why put any a priori restrictions on the set of admissible
102.5 A Parametric Example
Consider a second example which contains a speciﬁc parametric speciﬁcation for the economy.
Let Ω ⊂ I R
n
+ be convex. The economic state is ωt = (ω1t,...,ωnt) where ωit is Citizen i’s wealth
at date t. Policy pt ∈ [0,1] taxes wealth to generate revenue pt
Pn
j=1 ωjt used to produce public
capital. Each period, a citizen’s future wealth is produced by augmenting existing wealth with
public investment that takes as inputs labor and tax revenue, the latter using a ﬂat tax pt on
wealth. Formally:









where eit ∈ [emin,emax] is i’s labor eﬀort, γ is the depreciation rate, Bi is a citizen-speciﬁc
productivity parameter, and νi is a random shock with compact support [νmin,νmax]. Stage
game payoﬀs are ui = (A + ωit(1 − pt))β − e2
it where A is a positive constant, and 0 < β ≤ 1.
Here, individuals diﬀer only by wealth, and ui is increasing in after-tax wealth (1 − p)ωit and
decreasing in labor eﬀort eit.
Private sector actions are determined individually, while the public sector decisions are as
follows. Let Θ be a compact subset of I R
n
+. Now for each θt a politically feasible (public)







where, one may recall, J is deﬁned in (7) as the set of individuals who weakly prefer the public
actions (ψ(ht),µ(ht)) to (pt,θt+1).
In other words, θit deﬁnes the weight placed on i’s income in the aggregation of votes. If
θit = 1
n then the each individual is allocated ωit votes in a majority vote — as in the previous
example. Alternatively, if θit = (
ωit P
j ωjt)−1 then all individuals are weighted equally, and the
rule is a simple majority voting rule in that period. In between these extremes, citizens face a
classic choice: how much should wealth matter in determining political power?11
Unfortunately, this straightforward parameterization does not admit a closed form solution.
On the positive side, the joint assumption on preferences and technology satisfy the conditions
political rules? First, there may be technological reasons that certain political institutions are not available.
Second, and more signiﬁcantly, note that Θ is an index set, and “the set of all indices” is not a well deﬁned
object. One could then look at a proscribed set of “voting rules” but even then the boundaries are ad hoc.
Without exogenous limits the problem can quickly degenerate into an inﬁnite regress problem (see Vassilakis
(1991) and Lagunoﬀ (1992)). In our case, we take as given a limited set of admissible rules, and examine the
consequences for equilibrium existence.
11This choice is sometimes phrased as whether or not individuals favor a “timocracy,” (a term coined by
Aristotle (350 BCE), describes a rule by which property is decisive).
11for Grandmont’s (1978) Intermediate Preference Assumption. In particular, notice that the
wealth ordering on I is preserved across all states. Hence, these preferences satisfy the order
restriction property of Rothstein (1990). Rothstein’s Theorem can therefore be applied to show
that at each date, public decisions are rationalized by at least one individual’s recursive payoﬀ









Notice that individual it is the pivotal individual whose inclusion is decisive in comprising a








Signiﬁcantly, despite the richness of this particular set of voting rules, the identity of in-
dividual it may nevertheless change over time. The reason is that the delegation of decision
authority from one it to a diﬀerent it+1 may be a necessary commitment device in order to
induce more favorable private eﬀort from the rest of the citizenry.12 Nevertheless, despite the
dynamic inconsistency, it is later veriﬁed that this example satisﬁes conditions suﬃcient to
imply the existence of a unique politically feasible Markov proﬁle which is almost everywhere
diﬀerentiable in the state.
3 The Main Result
3.1 An Outline of the Problem
In this Section we state an existence theorem for politically feasible strategies when the aggre-
gator F satisﬁes a separability assumption speciﬁed below. The theorem establishes existence
of Markov strategies that are, in fact, smooth functions of the economic state. Smoothness is
highly desirable in many applications. In particular, in most dynamic models of policy, equilib-
ria are characterized by their Euler equations. These Euler equations are more elaborate than
those in single agent problems since they include intertemporal eﬀects that other agents’ future
policy functions have on a decision maker’s policy decision in the current period. Computing
these eﬀects require solutions to higher order diﬀerential equations of future policy functions.13
Hence, smooth existence is required in order to validate the computational solutions.
12See Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2006). That paper has an example similar to this one, except that there is no
random shock, A = 0, β = 1, and there is accumulation in a public good rather than in private wealth. In that
case a closed form for a Markov equilibrium exists and satisﬁes it+1 = Kit for some constant K with K 6= 1.
13See Basar and Olsder (1999) for a general formulation. See Klein, Krusell, and Rios-Rull (2002) for an
Euler equation characterization of macro policy games, and Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2004) for an Euler equation
characterization for political games.
12Existence of Markov equilibria in stochastic games has long been known to be problematic.
Recent contributions include Amir (1996), Curtat (1996), and Novak (2007) who make use
of convexity assumptions on transitions, and supermodularity restrictions on preferences and
transitions. Our result makes use of an innovation from Horst (2005) who proves existence of
Lipschitz-continuous (hence, almost everywhere smooth) Markov Perfect equilibria in dynamic
games. His result makes use of a “moderate social inﬂuence” (MSI) assumption whereby the
interactions between players are suﬃciently weak. The MSI assumption apparently originates
from a restriction on payoﬀs in a local interaction model of Horst and Scheinkman (2002). The
idea, roughly, is that one’s own actions have a relatively greater eﬀect on one’s own marginal
dynamic payoﬀ than those of all other individuals combined. MSI overcomes a common problem
in dynamic games. Generally, continuity of each player’s “Bellman’s” operator fails because it
conﬂicts with conditions required for compactness of the function space to which the operator
applies. One can recover continuity of the Bellman operator if there are uniform, Lipschitzian
bounds on the players’ marginal best replies in each state in the dynamic game. The MSI
assumption establishes existence of such bounds.
Our upcoming existence theorem diﬀers from Horst’s smooth existence theorem in two
respects. First, the present result applies to dynamically inconsistent preferences. From the
example in Section 2.4, it is clear that attempt to transform the dynamic political game into a
standard stochastic game will be thwarted by the implied dynamic inconsistency of the “public
decision maker.” For instance, in our examples of Sections 2.4 and 2.5 the dynamic preferences
of it over continuations starting from t + 1 onward will not generally coincide with that of it+1
who “takes over” at the beginning of t + 1. For this reason, the problem does not translate
into a standard stochastic game since the preferences of the current public decision maker are
dynamically inconsistent. In this sense, the present result represents an important extension
of known results on equilibrium existence, even before considering the additional extension to
dynamic political games.
Second, the ﬁxed point argument diﬀers. Horst ﬁrst applies a ﬁxed point argument for
bounded state spaces. These ﬁxed points are smooth Markov equilibria of the game with
bounded states. He then extends the result by taking a uniform limit of ﬁxed points as the
bound is sequentially relaxed. In the present environment, it is not clear how to proceed
with this line of argument since the state space itself identiﬁes the characteristics of a player-
aggregator, independently of which state the system is currently in. The aggregator in state
ωt when the state space is Ω may be diﬀerent from the aggregator in state ωt when the state
space is ˜ Ω ⊃ Ω. The problem does not arise in the present argument because we apply the ﬁxed
point argument directly to the full, unbounded state space. The trade oﬀ is that our theorem
employs stronger boundedness assumptions throughout the state space (see (A2) below).
133.2 Separability
Our existence theorem requires one additional assumption on the aggregator. It happens that
this assumption is implicit in virtually all dynamic models of welfare or social aggregation. An
aggregator F is separable if for every pair (ωt,θt),
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In other words, a separable F is time separable and linearly homogeneous in the discount
weights (1 − δ,δ). To understand just how common this assumption is, observe that the stan-
dard formulation of social welfare is given by F(V1,...,V1, ωt,θt) =
P
i βiVi which is separable.
The Wealth-as-Power rule introduced in Section 3 is also separable. As is the recently popu-
lar hyperbolic aggregator.14 The last two are dynamically inconsistent while the ﬁrst is not.
The welfare function (
P
i Vi)
1/2 is not separable (and is dynamically inconsistent). Generally,
nonseparable aggregators are inconsistent, but inconsistent aggregators may or may not be
separable. Separability therefore rules out certain forms of inconsistency such as those due to
“income eﬀects” in the future consumption arising from changes in current consumption - as in
this square root example. But it preserves some natural inconsistencies due to the rule’s direct
dependence on the state, independently of its indirect dependence through citizens’ preferences.
In the Wealth as Power rule, the aggregator that decides on pt and θt+1 is forever identiﬁed by
ωt even in all future states ωτ,τ > t. This puts a type ωt aggregator in conﬂict with future
types ωτ that later inhabit the same decision authority.
We call a Dynamic Political Game, G, separable if its class of political rules is jointly
rationalized by the citizens and a separable aggregator F. In the remainder, we restrict attention
to DPGs that are separable.
3.3 Transformation to an Extended Stochastic Game
In this Section, we temporarily abstract away public decisions pt and θt+1 and from the political
aggregation problem. Consider an (n + 1)-player game that contains the basic elements of
a standard stochastic game. However, in this game, individuals have possibly dynamically
inconsistent preferences of a particular form described below.
To distinguish this game notationally from the original dynamic political game, deﬁne an
extended stochastic game by
¯ G = h (¯ V1t,..., ¯ Vn+1 t )
∞
t=0, ¯ E1,..., ¯ En+1, ¯ q, ¯ Ω, ¯ ω0 i
14See, for example, Krusell, Kuruscu, and Smith (2002).
14In ¯ G, ¯ eit ∈ ¯ E is each player’s action in period t, the state is ¯ ωt ∈ ¯ Ω, and ¯ q(·|¯ ωt, ¯ et) denotes the
Markov Probability distribution over future states ¯ ωt+1. The dynamic payoﬀ to individual i at
date t is given by




τ−t−1πi(¯ ωτ, ¯ eτ; ¯ ωt)
 
 ht] (10)
In (10) the ﬁrst payoﬀ vi can be interpreted as the stage payoﬀ of the current decision maker in
the current date. The subsequent payoﬀs, all deﬁned by the function πi, are the stage payoﬀs
to this same decision maker in subsequent periods. The payoﬀ in (10) clearly satisﬁes the
separability assumption, but it allows for two avenues of possible inconsistency. One comes
from the diﬀerence between vi and πi. The other comes from the dependence of future payoﬀs
on the current state ωt. Intertemporal trade-oﬀs between present and future stage payoﬀs
may be diﬀerent than the trade-oﬀs between any pair of future stage payoﬀs. Of course, in the
special case where vi(¯ ωτ, ¯ eτ) = πi(¯ ωτ, ¯ eτ; ωt), ∀τ we have the standard (dynamically consistent)
formulation of a stochastic game.
As is standard, a subgame perfect equilibrium in ¯ G is a proﬁle ¯ σ of history contingent actions
that are sequentially rational for each player after every history. A Markov Perfect equilibrium
is a subgame perfect equilibrium in Markov strategies.
With one additional caveat, any separable n-person dynamic political game G may be
transformed into a (n+1)-player extended stochastic game ¯ G. The one caveat is that one must
allow for mixed strategies on the institutional choice of θt+1 in order to convexify it. Let ∆(Θ)
denote the set of probability distributions on Θ (recall that Θ is compact though possibly not
convex). Let β ∈ ∆(Θ) an element of this set. An institutional strategy µ∗ is a mixed behavioral
strategy expressed as µ∗(ht) = βt. The deﬁnition of political feasibility can be extended to µ∗
in the obvious way.
We transform a dynamic political game G to an extended stochastic game ¯ G as follows. Let
¯ Ω = Ω × Θ. Let ¯ Ei = E for each i = 1,...,n and let ¯ En+1 = P × ∆(Θ). Hence, a state is
¯ ωt = (ωt,θt) as before. The technology, expressed as a density,15 is deﬁned as:
d¯ q(¯ ωt+1|¯ ωt, ¯ et) = dq(ωt+1|ωt,et,pt)dβ(θt+1)
Payoﬀs are as follows. For each private citizen i = 1,...,n,
vi(¯ ωτ, ¯ eτ) = πi(¯ ωτ, ¯ eτ; ¯ ωt) = ui(ωt,et,pt)
Finally, for the public player i = n + 1 his payoﬀs are
vn+1(¯ ωt, ¯ et) = F(u(ωt,et,pt); ωt,θt)
15The notation for the density may be expressed by dq(·|ω,e,p), i.e., the instantaneous change in distribution
q.
15in date t, and
πn+1(¯ ωτ, ¯ eτ; ¯ ωt) = F(u(ωτ,eτ,pτ); ωt,θt).
in any date τ > t
Notice that under this transformation, only the public player (the aggregator) has dy-
namically inconsistent preferences. However, we clearly utilize the separability assumption by
associating stage payoﬀs in the transformed game to the aggregator’s stage payoﬀ in the original
DPG. With this transformation, we have the following result:
Theorem 1 Let G be any separable dynamic political game with n citizens, and ¯ G the trans-
formation of G to an extended stochastic game with n+1 players. Then G admits a politically
feasible Markov strategy proﬁle (σ,ψ,µ∗) whenever ¯ G admits a Markov Perfect equilibrium, ¯ σ.
Our approach will therefore be to establish conditions under which a Markov Perfect equi-
librium exists in the transformed game. Speciﬁcally, ¯ σ will vary only with ¯ ωt, the current
state.
3.4 An Existence Theorem for Extended Stochastic Games
Assumptions are now given for ¯ G which collectively imply existence of a smooth Markov equi-
librium. However, to make sense of these assumptions, the following deﬁnitions and notational
conventions are necessary. First, let H : I R
` → I R
k be any C∞ (smooth) function, and let ||·||r
denote the sup norm on the rth derivative DrH : I R















In this notation, || · ||0 is the standard sup norm on H. Next, endow the class of all such
functions with the topology of C∞-uniform convergence on compacta. Formally, Hm → H in
this topology if, for any compact set Y ⊂ I R
`, {Hm} converges to H C∞-uniformly on Y
(i.e., for each r and each rth partial derivative, ||DrHm − DrH||r → 0 on Y ). The function
H is C∞-uniformly bounded if it is smooth and there is some some ﬁnite number L > 0 that
uniformly bounds H and bounds all its higher order derivatives in sup norm.
Next, deﬁne a real valued function, g : I R
` → I R to be α-concave with α > 0 if g(x)+ 1
2α||x||2
is concave.16 Notice that α = 0 corresponds to the standard deﬁnition of concavity. When
α > 0, then α-concavity is obviously a stronger curvature condition. α-concavity is used
elsewhere in the literature to bound higher order derivatives via the Implicit Function Theorem.
It is used here for a similar purpose.
16An equivalent deﬁnition is: g is α-concave if the matrix D2g + αI, with I denoting the identity matrix, is
negative semi-deﬁnite.
16In what follows we ﬁx an extended game ¯ G. However, we drop the cumbersome “bar”
notation and write simply et and ωt to denote action proﬁles and states, respectively. In
addition, we adopt the usual convention of using primes, e.g., ω0 to denote subsequent period’s
variables, ωt+1, with double primes, ω00 for ωt+2, and so on.
(A1) Each Ei is a compact, convex subset of a Euclidian space, and Ω is a convex subset of a
Euclidian space.
(A2) (Uniform Bounds) For each i, there are numbers Li,L−i,K > 0 such that the payoﬀ
functions vi and πi are smooth and C∞-uniformly bounded by Li. In particular, vi,πi are
uniformly bounded above by some K ≤ Li and De−i[Dvi] and De−i[Dπi] are uniformly
bounded by L−i < Li. Also, q(·| ω,e) admits a norm continuous density with respect to
Lebesgue measure, and there is an M > 0 such that for each ω0 and each ω, the density
dq(ω0| ω,·) as a function of e is assumed to be C∞-uniformly bounded by M.
(A3) (Concavity) For each i, there is an αi > 0 such that for each ω, vi is αi-concave in ei.
(A4) (Moderate Social Inﬂuence) There exists a 0 < γ < 1 such that for each i, the bounds
M, K, L−i, and αi jointly satisfy:
(1 − δ)L−i + 2δKM
αi
≤ γ(1 − δ).
Assumptions (A1), (A3), and a closely related version of (A4) are also assumed in Horst
(2005). Assumption (A4) is the Moderate Social Inﬂuence (MSI) discussed earlier. Assumption
(A2) is stronger than the boundedness assumptions of Horst, in that it places uniform bounds on
all higher order derivatives, rather than just a uniform Lipschitzian bound on ﬁrst diﬀerences.
The stronger assumption is needed for dealing with the added problem of dynamic inconsistency
mentioned earlier. On the upside, we obtain the stronger conclusion that the equilibrium is
almost everywhere smooth (C∞) rather than just Lipschitz. When applied to the transformed
game, these assumptions imply that a political rule must be jointly rationalized an F and
private preferences that satisfy (A1)-(A4). The class of weighted rules in Section 2.5 is one
example that satisﬁes the assumptions (provided that individual preferences do so as well).
Theorem A Let ¯ G denote an extended stochastic game satisfying (A1)-(A4). Then ¯ G admits
a Markov Perfect equilibrium ¯ σ that is almost everywhere smooth in the state ωt.
The proof of Theorem A is in the Appendix. Together, the rules-into-players transformation
and Theorem A imply:
Theorem 2 Let G be any separable dynamic political game such that the transformation of G
into an extended stochastic game ¯ G satisﬁes (A1)-(A4). Then G admits a politically feasible
Markov proﬁle (σ,ψ,µ∗) that is almost everywhere smooth in the composite state (ωt,θt).
17To get a sense of the kinds of environments that are covered by the theorem, observe that
the Parametric Model in Section 2.5 satisﬁes the conditions of the Theorem in an open set
of parameter values of A,β,γ,η, the discount factor δ, the initial wealth distribution ω0, and
productivity parameters (Bi). To see this, consider any smooth density on νi with compact




j ej)1−η. To verify (A1), notice ﬁrst that all choice
sets are compact and the state space is obviously convex. As for (A2), let Bmax = maxi Bi.





≡ ¯ ω, then one can verify that ui is uniformly bounded
above. Also, norm continuity of the density dq follows from norm continuity in the mean, and
both ui and dq are C∞-uniformly bounded if η is suﬃciently small and A suﬃciently large.17
Regarding (A3), the payoﬀ ui is αi-concave for αi = max{−2,β(1 − β)Aβ( ¯ ω
A)2}. Finally, the
MSI assumption (A4) holds if δ is not too large.
4 Summary Discussion
This paper proves an existence theorem for a class of dynamic political games (DPGs). In DPGs,
political institutions are instrumental objects of choice each period. Decisions are determined
by social choice rules that aggregate proﬁles of dynamic recursive preferences of individuals.
The public sector decisions include parameters of future political rules. Hence, rules used in
date t + 1 are a part of the decision determined by rules in date t.
Our approach to modeling political institutions as social choice rules is reminiscent of static
models of “self-selected rules” of Koray (2000) and Barbera and Jackson (2000), and models
on inﬁnite regress in choice of rules in Lagunoﬀ (1992) and Vassilakis (1992). These all posit
social orderings on the rules themselves based on the outcomes that these rules prescribe. The
present model diﬀers from these in that institutional choice occurs in real time. This makes
possible an analysis of explicit dynamics of change. More importantly, however, the present
paper shares the stance taken by these models that social choice is a useful starting point for
a theory of endogenous institutions.
In particular, social choice admits convenient and canonical notions of rules while avoiding
detail-sensitive speciﬁcations inherent in many strategic voting games. Many common dynamic
voting games can, in fact, be mapped into a social choice setting. In the companion to the
present paper, Lagunoﬀ (2006, Section 4.4) has an example in which a noncooperative delegation
game is mapped into the present model. In that example, the constructed aggregator F is
dynamically inconsistent and so the present result can be used to resolve the issue of equilibrium
existence. Other “transformable” games include some dynamic legislative bargaining games,
notably Kalandrakis (2004), Battaglini and Coate (2007a,b), and Bowen and Zahran (2007).
17Note ωi is bounded by ¯ ω as deﬁned above. In turn, rth-order derivatives of ui then converge to 0 as r → ∞
if A > ωi.
18In these games the political rule θ is ﬁxed, and at each date a randomly selected proposer from
a group of legislators chooses a policy which is then ratiﬁed by the remaining legislators using
a voting protocol. While the details of the transformation are omitted, one could anticipate
how it works: ω identiﬁes both a status quo allocation and the identity of the proposer whose
preferences are given by F(·,ω); meanwhile, the ratiﬁcation decisions are a part of the private
decisions of citizen-legislators. In other words, the proposer’s problem is given by (6) in the
present paper, while those of the ratiﬁers are given by (5).18 Signiﬁcantly, the resulting F in the
Kalandrakis and Bowen and Zahran models will be dynamically inconsistent because diﬀerent
proposers have inherently diﬀerent preferences toward the policy.19
The social choice approach is common in many dynamic macro models of political economy
and has been for some time. Building on the time consistent policy literature, Krusell, Quadrini,
and R´ ıos-Rull (1997) posited an exogenous “political aggregator function” (a social welfare
function) to determine policy. Even in their case where the political institution is taken as
exogenous, the “existence” problem is nontrivial. The problem is resolved in Krusell, et. al.,
and in most of the literature that followed, by assuming either that there are only two types of
agents, or that the policy space is uni-dimensional and per period payoﬀs have a special form
to generate single peaked recursive preferences.20
In the present model, single peaked preference assumptions are not suﬃcient since the public
decisions are inherently multi-dimensional: both the current policy and the future political rule
are determined each period. A few papers examine dynamic models of voting that speciﬁcally
allow for multi-dimensional choice spaces (though maintaining an exogenous voting rule). These
include Bernheim and Nataraj (2004), Kalandrakis (2004), and Banks and Duggan (2003).
However useful, these models have limited applicability in the present context because diﬀerent
institutions often manifest diﬀerent types of inconsistencies. To my knowledge, no one has
examined the general existence problem when institutions are endogenous.
Surprisingly, not so much is known about dynamic aspects of endogenous institutional
change. Papers that do address such aspects include Roberts (1998, 1999), Gradstein and Just-
man (1999), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001, 2005), Lagunoﬀ (2001), Barbera, Maschler,
and Shalev (2001), Messner and Polborn (2004), Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2006a,b), Gradstein (2007),
Powell (2004), Cervellati, et al. (2006), Greif and Laitin (2004), and Egorov and Sonin (2005).
These all posit useful dynamic/repeated game models in which one speciﬁc type of reform
18An appropriate modiﬁcation is required to account for the fact that the stage game in these models is
sequential rather than simultaneous.
19In their models, the policy is purely redistributive, and so each legislator prefers a distribution that allocates
the largest possible share of the pie for his/her district. Interestingly, the inconsistency does not arise in the
Battaglini and Coate models. The reason is that in their models, the redistributive component in the legislators’
payoﬀ functions is additively separable from the part that directly interacts with the state variable. Hence all
legislators have the same preferences toward the dynamic part of their payoﬀs. Consequently, the F that they
construct is dynamically consistent.
20See, more recently, Persson and Tabellini (2001) and Hassler, et. al. (2003) for other references.
19(e.g., the voting franchise, supermajority threshold, or the assassination of the current ruler) is
examined.21
Historically, institutional changes have often been multi-faceted and varied. Institutional
choice in the present paper is therefore not restricted. DPGs admit a broad array of institutional
changes. In a given game, all types of reforms can occur including changes in the voting
rule (majority vs supermajority rules), changes in voting rights (e.g. larger vs smaller voting
franchise), and changes in the scope of the public sector (e.g., expansions vs contractions of
regulatory authority).
Apart from this attribute, the main point of this exercise is to demonstrate how the problem
of existence of politically feasible strategies brings out some important attributes of preference
aggregation embodied by the political rule itself. Perhaps the most signiﬁcant of these attributes
is the inherent dynamic inconsistency in some rules. These inconsistencies becomes apparent
when the game is transformed into a more familiar stochastic game. The main result utilizes this
transformation to establish existence of smooth Markov equilibrium of the dynamic political
game.
Clearly, the conditions of the theorem apply to some interesting environments, but not to
others. This leaves open the question of just how far the analysis can go. For example, do
similar transformations exist if the political rules are jointly rationalized by citizens and by
aggregators that are not time separable? We leave this and other issues for future research.
5 Appendix
Proof of Theorem A We prove Theorem A in a series of Lemmata.
Fix an extended stochastic game
¯ G = h (¯ V1t,..., ¯ Vn+1 t)
∞
t=0, ¯ E1,..., ¯ En+1, ¯ q, ¯ Ω, ¯ ω0 i
satisfying the assumptions of Theorem A. In what follows we drop the “bar” notation in the
description above and write simply ei instead of ¯ ei, etc.
Let X denote the set of all uniformly bounded, Lipschitz continuous functions, x : Ω2 →
[0,K]n+1 expressed by x = (x1,...,xn+1). Each xi has uniform Lipschitz bound given by
(1 − δ)Li + δKM. The value of x is expressed as x(ω0,ω). Standard results show that X is
compact in the topology of uniform convergence on compacta (see, for example, Mas-Colell
21See the companion paper Lagunoﬀ (2006) both for a more detailed discussion of the literature, and for a
broader motivation, citing a number historical examples in which political institutions are modiﬁed.
20(1985, Theorem K.2.2). For each such function x ∈ X, deﬁne a one shot game by the payoﬀs,





for each i = 1,...,n+1. Then let H = (Hi)n
i=1 be the vector valued function with components
deﬁned by (11).
Lemma 1 For each state ω and each continuation value x ∈ X, the one shot game deﬁned by
payoﬀ proﬁle, H(ω,·, x), has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium proﬁle,
(ξ1(ω,x),...,ξn(ω,x) )
of private decisions. The proﬁle ξ is smooth with uniformly bounded ﬁrst derivatives in ω, and
is uniformly bounded and continuous in x.
Proof of Lemma 1 Observe ﬁrst that by Assumptions (A1)-(A3), Hi is a smooth and
C∞-uniformly bounded function of (ω,e) (in the relative topology), with uniform bound given
by
(1 − δ)Li + δKM (12)
Clearly, this bound is independent of x since x is itself uniformly bounded by K. Consequently,
Hi is uniform bounded on its entire domain.
Next, deﬁne α∗
i ≡ αi(1−δ) − δKM. Observe that α∗
i > 0 by (A4). We show that for each
state ω, Hi is α∗
i-concave in ei. To show this, we must show that for each ω, D2
eiHi(ω,e x)+α∗
iI
is negative semi deﬁnite. To this end, ﬁx ω. Observe that by α-concavity on stage utility
functions vi and the uniform boundedness of xi and dq (Assumption (A2)), we have for every




















 ω, ˆ e)

· ei








i > 0, it follows that Hi is α∗
i-concave. Consequently, by compactness of E (Assumption
(A1)), and by the smoothness and strict concavity of Hi in ei, the best response
gi(ω,e−i,x) ≡ argmax
ei∈E Hi(ω,e,x)
21for each i is nonempty and single valued.
Consider the best response function, gi. There are two possibilities: either gi(ω,e−i,x)
deﬁnes a critical point, i.e.,
DeiHi(ω,gi(ω,e−i,x),e−i,x) = 0.
or gi(ω,e−i,x) is locally constant. In the latter case, gi is obviously smooth with uniformly
bounded derivatives. In the case of the former, the Implicit Function Theorem can be applied
since Hi is strictly concave. It follows that gi is a locally smooth function in a neighborhood of





Given the C∞-uniform bound on Hi given by (12), the α∗
i-concavity of Hi implies that there
is a uniform bound on Dgi given by 1
α∗
i [(1 − δ)Li + δKM]. Finally, since the choice of (ω,e−i)
was arbitrary, every such point is a regular point and so gi is once again smooth with uniformly
bounded ﬁrst derivative.
We now show that there is a unique Nash equilibrium, ξ(ω,x) of the game with payoﬀs,
H(ω,·,x). Fixing ω and x, consider the best response map
e 7→ (g1(ω,e−1,x),...gn(ω,e−n,x) ).
By the arguments above, the conditions for Brouwer’s Theorem are met and so this map has a
ﬁxed point ξ. Since all best responses are interior — as shown above — the ﬁxed point must
be an interior point in En. To verify that this ﬁxed point is unique, it suﬃces to show that the
best response diﬀerence map
e 7→ e − (g1(ω,e−1,x),...gn(ω,e−n,x) ) (13)
has no critical points. It suﬃces then to show that the Jacobian of this map at diﬀerentiable
points is nonsingular. In turn, the Jacobian is nonsingular if it has a dominant diagonal. The
Jacobian has a dominant diagonal if
||De−igi||1 < 1, ∀i, (14)
at points (ω,e−i,x) of the best response map, gi. To verify (14), consider the best response
map, gi. Then we have:



















[(1 − δ)L−i + δKM]
=
(1 − δ)L−i + δKM
(1 − δ)αi − δKM
<
(1 − δ)L−i + δKM
(1 − δ)αi − δKM
γ
≤ γ < 1
(15)
The ﬁrst equality is the Implicit Function Theorem.22 The ﬁrst inequality follows from the
deﬁnition of α∗-concavity. The second follows from the Uniform Bounds Assumption (Assump-
tion (A2)). The next (second) equality follows from the deﬁnition of α∗
i, and the last inequality
follows from the MSI condition (Assumption(A4)).
Next, we show that the proﬁle ξ is smooth with uniformly bounded ﬁrst derivatives in ω
with the bound uniform across all x as well. Using the nonsingularity of (13) and the Implicit
Function Theorem (IFT), Dωξ is smooth and deﬁned by
Dωξ = [I − Deg]
−1[Dωg]
Note that the inverse [I − Deg]−1 exists and is uniformly bounded over all ω and all x by the
dominance diagonal condition, (15). Consequently, Dωξ exists everywhere and is uniformly
bounded over all ω and x.
Finally, we now prove that ξ is Lipschitz continuous in x with uniform Lipschitz constant.
This follows from a result of Montrucchio (1987, Theorem 3.1). In particular, their result
implies that for each i, each ω, and any pair x,x0,
||gi(ω,·,x) − gi(ω,·,x
0)||0 < γ||x − x
0||0 (16)
where γ is the MSI bound in Assumption (A4). Using the diﬀerence map in (13) to deﬁne the
ﬁxed points, the Implicit Function Theorem again implies that (16) applies to the ﬁxed point,
ξ, as well to the best response map g.









, ∀j 6= i
23Using Lemma 1, let ξ = (ξ1,...,ξn+1) be the map that deﬁnes the unique Nash equilibrium
ξ(ω,x) = (ξ1(ω,x),...,ξn+1(ω,x) )
for the one shot game with payoﬀs, Hi(ω,e,x), i = 1,...,n + 1.








0| ω,e ) (17)




i=1 ∈ X. That is, H∗
i is a smooth function of the pair (ω, ˜ ω)
with a uniformly bounded ﬁrst derivative. This bound is uniform across all x.
Proof of Lemma 2 By deﬁnition,
H
∗





The smoothness therefore follows from the smooth of πi and xi directly and from the smoothness
of ξ(ω,x) in ω established in Lemma 1. The uniform boundedness of ﬁrst derivatives in (ω, ˜ ω),
follows from the C∞-uniform boundedness of πi,xi and dq and the uniform boundedness of ﬁrst
derivatives of ξ established in Lemma 1.
Now deﬁne the operator T on X by




n+1(ω, ˜ ω,ξ(ω,x),x) ) (18)
By Lemma 2, the function (Tx) is smooth in (ω, ˜ ω) with uniformly bounded ﬁrst derivative,
this bound being uniform over all x. That is, Tx has a uniform Lipschitz bound. Consequently,
Tx ∈ X for all x ∈ X.
Lemma 3 T is a continuous operator.
Proof Lemma 3 Let {x`} be a sequence such that x` ∈ X for all ` and x` → x ∈ X
with the convergence uniform on each compact set Y ⊂ Ω as ` → ∞. By Lemma 2, we also
know that by Lipschitz continuity of ξ in x, ||ξ(·,x`) − ξ(·,x)|| → 0 uniformly in a pair (ω, ˜ ω).
Consequently, by the smoothness properties of vi and πi for each i and of dq we can ﬁx  > 0
and let ¯ ` satisfy for all ` ≥ ¯ `, all ω0 and all i, ||πi(·,ξ(·,x`); · ) − πi(·,ξ(·,x); · )||0 < , and
|dq(ω0
 
ω,ξ(ω,x) ) − dq(ω0
 
ω,ξ(ω,x`) )| < .
















`) )||0 < 











≤ (1 − δ)||πi(·,ξ(·,x

















< (1 − δ) + δ = 
Hence T is continuous.
Using Lemma 3, T maps continuously from the compact set X into X. By Schauder’s Fixed




Therefore, the proﬁle, ¯ σ = (¯ σ1,..., ¯ σn+1 ) deﬁned by ¯ σi(ω) = ξi(ω,x∗) is a Markov perfect
equilibrium that is an almost everywhere smooth function of ω.
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